

7-8-12

(Home-front - hospital  
(Home front hospital info  
(Dowling, Robert)

K-10 C-II referee was exactly - no more, no less -

careful

methodical

with several

imposed

clear with regard to a complex of motives,  
intended

political

effective

as our NATO policy

too owes to Turkey (Home planes...)

IRBM to Turkey, Iraq, UK (Home, France)

or too owes in Warsaw Pact territory

much better than SAC - alert! (cf. air alert)

(too owes our aircraft less likely to be  
triggered - visually <sup>or worse</sup> by false alarm - in  
absence of actual shooting attack (non-aircraft)

than SAC or too aircraft. Very unlikely to  
non-aircraft attack (un-aircraft, protect)

therefore they (+ by SAC) cannot be withheld by  
command.

2.

Even smart leaders can make — and permit in; established — very causal, uneventful, “easy,” absurd,” pursue, expectation, estimate, attach to policy (its feasibility, its course

RBE: What are 4 or 5 things paper don't know about C-I; and lessons to be drawn...

(You have to — smart, complex, capable (knows...) to contain catastrophes like these

Not being able to comprehend motivations of your advisors — or the perception of our policies...

Then people have to go for The Big Kabloo, against the odds, Win Everything...

It's not

(“We used over — now — be so stupid as to install a reactor for us never (?) with no plan for decommission

— for a nuclear plant is the biggest earthquake you, subject to tsunami

— risk the global economy...

(all of Bent + Biegelb...

7-5-12

so - was NATO (now) the means to keep

AD

Control of Cuban missiles: one US option will be  
(to be threatened of overflight or provoked)

then + SJC over believed is missiles

Was K decision to put MRBMs in Cuba better than  
US decision to put in Turkey?

(approval of K; avoidance (2d thoughts) of the  
(+ AW + me))

But K didn't have so attrited

to the NPK side - ≈ Allies, MN, Poles

by repeated bluff vs. US

(as US Europe not being  
engaged, apparently, to date,  
ripes US - → change  
"2d-tier states - kill Europe!"  
(cannot trust SU)

and that of UA was useful for  
deterring attack - a real threat to Cuba.

During the time: FA!

The objectives to deployment of Jupiter's didn't  
apply to Cuba - give willingness to "be helpful"  
of Cuba's (+ capture of SU control, while France)  
+ except for (?) loss of weight superior response!

Was it helpful/open to the US,  
or the world

as distinct from war, which  
to JCK's father, if I, the Dan -

to deny SU recognition as "equal  
persons, equal rights" — by public trade  
(or by little means etc.)?

Sitthak appears to have compelled  
K to back off with no major concessions —  
but doing something US had "promised  
itself to do," we must assume to do —

— confirming a US alliance for beyond its  
borders, and we seek alliance for SU right  
on its borders.

1

7-4-2

See Bush memo, etc.

K & Bush: Would you yourself go to the way of Bush?

||(JFK = NO - or for other (but above, Bush mostly)  
(good) (no. Bernstein opinion; Stone?)

but what will will be + other take?

Craig?

Howard?

K not feel WTF (JFK)

\*Bush, Bush: see U-2

U's reids were not as gent as to  
unuse have been -

- if JFK didn't believe Belshakow...
- (ignorant of U-2 and info flying)
- IF EITHER JFK or K had want what by  
fair?

- still analysts did blame on: MREMS

too many

workbooks

50 units

K blamed:

- substantially (80%)
- coverup
- no back-up - confirm is many
- no time to answer too many

(AWW: consider form. every will act "naturally".)  
Reason:

Invasion plan for Cuba.

(Stimson was right (Roosevelt agreeing))

VFR had reason to feel confident

(not

A.8

C-II (1) Shared World  
Convergence of our TW empire, regions  
problems in former colonial (Spain, US:)  
states, or "little spheres" (Hull), was but  
like big <sup>little</sup> sphere VN, Indonesia, Malaysia, SVA/MDA,  
(Taiwan), South Korea, (Japan) Iran, Saudi Arabia,  
[Israel]; confrontation

(2) our core sphere — West Europe + Berlin  
(Japan?)

(Note: in first instance: EUROPE)

FU threat of US

(penetration)

vs. invasion

= US NATO  
policy

{ BUT: FU threat of SU (USA) (two areas)  
FU threat of SU (USA) vs. invasion (MRBMs)  
EU threat of SU (MRBMs) vs. US FU in <sup>II-28s</sup> Europe  
(deterrence possible)

7-10-12

Were there any Soviet contingency plans for  
invading Berlin after Nov 1962?

PDS

If not — why not? Province?

Hooligan

Preventive control & (from outside US)

Spy ship?

(Northwoods — after '62?)

Did VFR & ROKC ready give up on Berlin? NO!

Under LBJ?

(C-I fly speak

Draw up an invasion?

Assess,

Review...

Did K give up on Berlin?

Brzezinski?

What became of their control of one fighter-bomber  
on alert?

(Were K or B confident we would not  
give arms to West Germany?

or help them do underground testing,  
like France?

Did Germans give up desire for arms?

Was so sure we our Germans would not  
return in September 1968? (in Poland?)

K not crazy — more (or less) than us, which CW prominent.

It was legal, logical, effective for K to  
and miners (and the arms + troops) to help —  
or, as much as the whole NATO policy  
(or more) — no more — or less — crazy

"if he could get away with it —  
and 1) he almost did" (except for Carter)  
2) if he'd played it right, he could have  
done so with big say;  
3) as it was, ~~although~~ it was curiously  
eg but to impose camouflage was obligatory,  
or that JFK could keep arms  
he could have pulled it off (telling the arms

He played it badly, except for transferring plane

- 1) Miss up to Oct 22 (Mikoyan —)
- 2) Miss until Oct 26 (via. UN) (Dale)
- 3) not displaying before S&S operational
- 4) not ~~allowing~~ the arms
- 5) Smiling tanks in
- 6) with one tankless! (+ not ~~allowing~~!)
- 7) Not coordinating w. Carter on camouflage
- 8) Saying JFK could keep arms 3-4 weeks
- 9) assuming JFK didn't know — until Oct 22
- 10) Obligation to Pliyev on the arms.
- 11) no Troop II

2-10-07

Invader of GDR (or attack): "Option"  
"Normal"

Not known:

why us war

Asymmetry of force balance

& didn't "have" to back down; (vs. me)

could have kept areas etc; or public truce;

give VPK as option; act Asym

(likely to be found at bluffs;  
to back down)

"Surprise" if attack carried out:

C-II

GW (new war)

foreign ST killed

(If then has areas

"GW a certainty" NO -

with war frontier even  
or violent. situation  
not stabl.

Human vs. "risk of GW us. same s-t loss"

(or: ~~united~~ <sup>united</sup> min. det: stable

External det v. friendly ("Kings, fathers")

"as if US attacked. we'll be on cross in  
entanglement)

"you can't (be found) bluff (ing)"

But K was peril bluff, am + am...

Gap:

Berlin (1948, 1958, 1960, 1961, <sup>1962</sup>~~1965~~)

C-II!

JFK: Laos '61

C-I

(VN '61) (+ remains to put in track)

C-II (not caught) (but ready to be!)

CBJ: (~~to~~ NC) remains of mobile

etc ~ NW...

refuted  
JFK expected to come out with a  
bigged-up public track (as in VN '65!)

(on basis of threats / bluff).

hopefully " " " "

and tank units: if not found, VN + Berlin  
critical ("small" risk) of regional or CW  
(lower than be thought: TN very united)

CVNxM: certainty of probe: only a small  
difference between a small ( $\approx 1$ ) risk and 0.

Can will or try to go to the game.

if risk is tight enough, try to turn enough

Never ever

7-10-12

JFK was ready to concede - if accusing  
from the start - yet prolonged crisis  
closed blockingly

(He should not have allowed the ASW  
(agmit to usurpings - → McCarthy's)

or air about? or disposal

(unconscious?)

low-level means? U-2?

We used McConaughay's start - but as a bluff, for which he (Kruschewski)

|| Why didn't JFK & RFK trust McConaughay's unconscious means? (as & used him; McConaughay's...)

(Private deal not enough; but why not  
alt., & start?)

Because K had that seen U-2? (: